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tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks 

tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

re: tech, Mastodon, fediverse blocks, long 

@Thib @cwebber i feel like this is misattributing consequences

3 is not a side effect of 2. 3 is the primary purpose. it is a bug and a huge mistake to treat it as a mere "side effect". 1 is a side effect of 3, if anything.

also, your issue with 1 is not wholly a mistake of the protocol in full. the mistake is sharedInbox for private posts --private posts should *not* be delivered to people outside their audience.

@trwnh @Thib @cwebber

> the mistake is sharedInbox for private posts --private posts should *not* be delivered to people outside their audience.

Right but even if it's not a sharedInbox it needs to exist on the shared server. If I block X@Y, and A@Y is a friend who can get private posts, no matter what happens, server Y is going to need to handle my private messages I send to A. And if Y is malicious, well.

This might be solved with some kind of end to end encryption.

@darius @Thib @cwebber well if a server is showing messages from one actor's inbox to another user that isn't authorized to view the inbox, then at least that makes it spec-incompliant

but yes, encrypting inboxes with your key could be done (shifting the problem slightly, from "malicious software" to "malicious admin"). you'd have to run your own client for it to matter, and monolithic apps like mastodon effectively bundle the client with the server.

@trwnh @Thib @cwebber I guess my main issue here is that you have to assume that malicious actors won't comply with the spec.

@darius @Thib @cwebber i guess my issue is that mastodon's architecture creates new problems outside of the spec

@darius @Thib @cwebber which is to say, the lack of client-server separation + the reliance on nonstandard signalling that is defeated even by one's own broken app-logic

almost everything about blocks in masto is broken, because masto itself makes broken assumptions. more specifically it's conflating authority and responsibility.

the server is leaking info between actors bc it *is* the client. users on shared instances may as well be using the same client, because they are (with ACLs).

@darius @Thib @cwebber if messages were sent to actors instead of instances, then there wouldn't be so many issues with blocks or whether they are explicitly signalled.

mastodon software effectively "knows too much", and this is why it assumes others must also know what it knows.

@trwnh @darius @Thib @cwebber
Maliciousness is not an actual requirement for harmful behavior. It's enough to do unwanted favors with the best intentions. Mastodon makes some compromises for performance and other compromises to support interaction. The sum of these compromises is a problem

First, you cannot send "Reject: Follow" when you mean "Block" because you're still federating block information even if you're not using the syntax described in the spec. You're also expecting the target server to retain that information, which is neither reasonable nor possible to assurance

Second, the origin has to provide explicit routing when message delivery may be affected by information that the destination server doesn't have. If you need to deliver to collections in most cases, then you need to identify the exceptions and handle them at origin

When someone on an instance is blocked by the sender then that instance can't be relied on to expand collections in its shared inbox. I'm not addressing implementation details beyond that. Perimeter security with current practices means that instances supporting vulnerable people need to block instances that allow toxic members or federate with toxic instances. That's what needs to be improved immediately

Maliciousness is a problem, but it's not *this* problem. Vulnerable people are capable of dealing with harmful situations decisively. The problem is dealing with centrists leaking information to harmful people while they waffle about the nature of the threat. If implementations deal with the leakage, theorists have a grace period to work on more comprehensive ways to address active threats

@yaaps @darius @Thib @cwebber Reject Follow is imo distinct from Block and also from Undo Accept Follow

if the Follow is stored (as it should be, since Follow must be Accepted and therefore cannot be transient) then you should be able to send Undo Accept Follow to return that account to the "follow requested" state, and Reject Follow to explicitly deny the request.

>instance can't be relied on to expand collections in its shared inbox

i'd argue this is true *always*, not just with blocks.

@yaaps @darius @Thib @cwebber in short: it is a Bad Idea to deliver non-public activities to sharedInbox, full stop. that cedes access control completely (and access control requires, well, *control*)

@trwnh
Reject follow in the absence of a follow is problematic. There's no problem rejecting an actual follow request or undoing an accept, but in the absence of a follow request it's just an obfuscated syntax for "block" and the obfuscation has been defeated

The expectation that a remote instance maintain a copy of any specific object is onerous, and that is required to honor a preemptive reject follow

Yes, delivery to the shared inbox is the root of many issues. I'm assuming that eliminating or significantly changing the nature of shared inbox is non-negotiable, though

You lose control as soon as data is in clear text on the remote and we're not getting end to end encryption anytime soon with such a large portion of users accessing the service through the browser

Whether it's desirable that ActivityPub be anything other than a deniable and insecure surface layer for negotiating secure connections over other protocols remains an open issue
@darius @Thib @cwebber

@yaaps @trwnh @darius @cwebber Mastodon reject follows along with blocks if there is an existing follow not if there isn't

The “stealth” blocks will not send a Block but it will send a Reject (and an Undo if there was an Accept) if and only if there is a follow request/active follow

@Thib
Okay. I had a misunderstanding that reject follow without an existing follow was being sent (or perhaps considered).

I'll find the source of that misunderstanding later and see if I can get some clarity on how that happened
@trwnh @darius @cwebber

@yaaps @darius @Thib @cwebber all Follow activities are a request by default convention. if your account is unlocked, the Accept is sent automatically. you can't Reject a Follow that doesn't have an id, so there's no such thing as a "pre-emptive" activity.

@yaaps @darius @Thib @cwebber re: "secure connections over other protocols", i find it best to think of activitypub as a wire format. c2s is basically imap and s2s is basically smtp. you can do pgp or autocrypt on top of cleartext if both clients support it (e.g. imagine if your inbox was decrypted in pinafore)

@yaaps @darius @Thib @cwebber
the issue with that would be key management, which right now is done on the server. you would have to sync your keys between clients (and this would have to be protected by some other mechanism, e.g. a password that is not discoverable by your sysadmin -- hashed, salted, etc)

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Mastodon (instance perso de ThibG)

This is a small personal instance running on a couple small ARM servers at home.